Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism, such as that of Jeremy Bentham and John S. Mill, prima face, is the philosophy of the maximization of utility as an ethical foundation. In this sense utility is the measure of happiness versus harm (dis-utility). The guiding principal of the doctrine being “The greatest happiness for the greatest number,” otherwise known as the Greater Happiness Principal. This appears to be all well and good, but it leaves a series of very important questions that the utilitarian is forced to answer before they can proceed with forming their ultimate views in regards to what is moral, ethical and just. Whose utility must be maximized over another if conflict arises? How is utility or dis-utility measured? Do there need to be constraints placed upon this philosophy, in regards to how it can be administered? This is to name but a few. These questions have lead to conflict within the ideas of utilitarianism itself, and makes its premises difficult to reconcile with the ideas of many, if not all, beliefs in an objective moral standard. I will attempt to compare and analyze utilitarianism from the perspective of a Natural Rights basis for ethics, something which I believe much of utilitarianism contradicts, despite many utilitarian perspectives basing their constraints on the same ideas as the Natural Rights philosophies.

Mill quite clearly and correctly states that “All action is for the sake of some ends.” This is an a priori true proposition that cannot be discounted without creating a logical paradox, as attempted refutation is itself an action. Mill then continues to state that “rules of action”1, that is morality, “must take their whole character and colour from the nature of the end to which they are subservient.” However, as human action, the conscious employment of means intended to reach a desired end, cannot occur without a felt unease or desire within the mind of the individual human in question, all ends grant a higher state of satisfaction to the individual in the ex ante sense. It is this expected state of satisfaction that is known as value, and this defines the nature of an end, but always ex ante. All valuations are inherently subjective, and even post ante or hindsight assessments of ends are always in relation to a desired future end by the individual assessor. It is for this reason that Mill's assertions that ends define the moral nature of actions does not hold as a standard for the development of a moral science. So if the ends of an action are not the basis for moral judgments, we are now left to observe the means to find the moral character of an individual action.

One admirable merit of Utilitarian Philosophy is that is calls on its adherents to consider the happiness of other individuals in regards to their actions. Most would see the nobility in considering the well being of another, and anecdotes suggest that it is an emotionally satisfying way of living when it comes to personal preference. Indeed, utility lies at the heart of all human action and interaction, and the comparative advantages held by individuals form the basis for social interaction and co-operation through trade. Trade and co-operation between individuals free from coercion and deception necessarily promotes happiness in the ex ante sense, or it would not occur. Therefore it appears to hold that all individuals seeking self-serving ends, can and do promote happiness in others. I do not believe Mill and Bentham gives any indication they believe otherwise in the portions of their work available to me, nor do they suggest that to act with self-interest is in anyway immoral.

From my best understanding of Mill and Bentham's work, an action is moral if it increases happiness in general without decreasing it, or alleviates suffering in general without increasing it. The available work by Bentham primarily seeks to extend this to animals as well, with the distinction that “ we may eat them, and we are better for it, and they are never worse.”2 He then indicates it is not immoral to kill and eat them, but we have no right to torment them or cause undue suffering. I regret, I must lay animals and Bentham aside for the major part of this analysis, as this appears to be peripheral to a core understanding of Utilitarianism and the morality of action. From the understanding I have gleaned, to Mill, and likely to Bentham, morality entails positive obligations to others, which Mill refers to as duty. That is to say, what we should do, as opposed to what we should refrain from doing. This implies that there are actions that human beings must perform on behalf of others, which in turn implies that one may be justifiably compelled to perform such actions. Indeed, Mill notes that “... Utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or … interest, of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole.”3 Taken in hand with the Greater Happiness Principal, it then becomes clear that coercion is justified by Utilitarianism, provided the outcome appears likely to lead to greater happiness for the majority of human beings, or for that of the society in question. This seems to be in part an answer to the question of whose utility takes precedence over another in a situation of conflict; ultimately, the good of the many outweighs that of the few. But how far can this be taken? If Bentham or Mill have an answer, it is not within the text provided. More importantly, how is the good of the whole to be discovered in the first place?

I posit that morality arises naturally between humans in order to prevent and settle conflicts between individuals. The basis of this morality is that each human has the right of ownership over himself or herself, as finite beings with the capacity to act. As action begins to involve the use and creation of scarce objects or areas, that self-ownership extends to the objects one creates, cultivates or appropriates for use from a state of being unowned by another. This right of ownership implies the right to transfer ownership, and creates the basis for trade of goods and services. This is a simple explanation of the foundations of the Natural Rights moral theory, which, unlike Utilitarianism, focuses on what individuals should not do to one another. The philosophy's central axiom can be expressed as “All are free to pursue whatever action they choose, so long as they do not initiate aggression against the person or property of another;” this may be known as the Non-aggression Axiom. Here individuals are free to maximize their utility and that of others within the boundaries provided by ownership of one's property, where the Utilitarian world would be contained only by expediency and an arbitrary calculus of “good” versus “bad” potential consequences for the happiness of the world.
I must at this point clarify that I do believe greatest happiness for the greatest number can only be achieved through a system of Property Rights and Liberty, things I do not believe Mill was personally averse towards. This belief has come about through extensive and ongoing study of the Economics of the “Austrian School” which regards economic science to be a subset of the deductive and axiomatic science, Praxeology; literally: The Logic of Action. But, whatever Mill's personal beliefs in regards to how utility was to be maximized, Utilitarianism, as such, lacks a theory of property and ownership. As an example of this, economist Ronald Coase, belonging to the Utilitarian “Chicago School,” maintained that a system of property rights could solve many unjust “externalities,” such as pollution without government intervention. The problem being, Coase failed to incorporate any theory of property into his thesis, leaving the allocation of property rights to be positivistically assigned by the government of the day, recommending that they do so to maximize monetary gain. How can what some arbitrary group deems most expedient be moral or just? Does this not render morality, ethics and justice subject to the potentially faulty calculus of the technocracy? Even Mill, with his devotion to Liberalism states: “On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures... the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final.”4 Now, to be fair to Mill, he was not here directly referring to justice, but to which type of pleasure should be found more important, but this is the only indication given of how he would have morality assessed, and disputes resolved. As seen as Utilitarianism revolves around happiness and various degrees of pleasure, this does seem to indicate what Mill would have applied all potential conflict.

So if Utility is to measured by the wise and learned, it follows from this that these people would be left with control over what is moral, ethical and just. The list of pros and cons they would use to pass down edicts from on high, is as much subject to error and manipulation as any calculus used by the bureaucrats of the Soviet Union. Indeed, as has been shown, valuations of action can only be made by the individuals concerned. Any outsider can only guess the value of an individual's action, and hence cannot truly calculate the best course of action. Attempts to do so on the macro level have, and necessarily will, over time erode as errors compound themselves and affect the decisions of both the Utilitarian assessors and the individual actors.

And now we are left with the question as to how Utilitarianism may be restrained in its administration. Mill puts forth that an individual does not need to extend his or her attempts to increase the general happiness beyond their sphere of influence whatever that may be, and only those capable of affecting greater society need concern themselves with the welfare of the world at large in relation to their actions. A profound insight as to how a Utilitarian must act, this may be, but its only real limitation is the power of the individual. One of great power and influence is hereby obligated to use such power in attempts to affect every life they can for what they see to be the greater good. However, it is in the interest of the powerful, even if they wish to help the cause of greater happiness, to maintain their power. The more one can affect, it follows logically, the more supposed good one can do. So even the benign Utilitarian is compelled to seek more power and influence, and if they see coercion as necessary in order to pursue the greatest utility, or maintain their power so that they may be able to pursue this utility, expedience tells them to use force against any opposition. So ultimately, Mill's assertion does not restrict people to their own realms of influence, but encourages them to seek more power for themselves. I am sure this was not Mill's intention, but it is the logical result of his beliefs.

Suppose now, that Utilitarianism disallowed coercion. (Indeed, the Utilitarian “Baxter Principal” is quite similar to the Non-aggression Axiom.) It would, then be strictly limited to personal philosophy for individual actors. They are free to take whatever actions they choose, and their choices would be based on the Greater Happiness Principal, provided they do not aggress against another. As a personal philosophy it would have no bearing on moral law, but would most likely, almost always, lead to admirable actions by its adherents, even if they do not necessarily acknowledge the existence of Natural Rights.

In reflection, Utilitarianism makes for a wonderful guiding philosophy of personal action. If one values good outcomes for others as well as for oneself, it is worthy of applause. But valuations of “good” and “bad” are not sufficient basis for an understanding of what makes morality, ethics and justice. Utility can never be elevated to the status of moral law, as this itself would undermine these concepts that are so integral to the very existence of society.